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Celebrated vote on the independence of Quebec from Canada

Quebec independence referendum

Oct xxx, 1995 (1995-10-30)
Do you lot agree that Quebec should become sovereign later having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the neb respecting the futurity of Quebec and of the understanding signed on June 12, 1995? French: Acceptez-vous que le Québec devienne souverain, après avoir offert formellement au Canada un nouveau partenariat économique et politique, dans le core du projet de loi sur 50'avenir du Québec et de l'entente signée le 12 juin 1995?
Results by constituency. Shades of blue indicate a "Yes" majority, while shades of red signal No. The darker the shade, the larger the majority.
Results
Response Votes % Yes ii,308,360 49.42% No 2,362,648 50.58% Total votes 4,757,509 100.00% Registered voters/turnout 5,087,009 93.52%

The 1995 Quebec referendum was the second referendum to ask voters in the predominantly French-speaking Canadian province of Quebec whether Quebec should proclaim sovereignty and become an independent country, with the condition precedent of offering a political and economic understanding to Canada.

The culmination of multiple years of argue and planning after the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional accords, the referendum was launched past the provincial Parti Québécois regime of Jacques Parizeau. Despite initial predictions of a heavy sovereignist defeat, an eventful and circuitous campaign followed, with the "Yes" side flourishing subsequently existence taken over by Bloc Québécois leader Lucien Bouchard.

The fast rise of the "Yes" campaign and apparent inability of the "No" campaign to counter its message created an atmosphere of great uncertainty, both in the federal authorities and beyond Canada^{[ commendation needed ]}.

Voting took place on 30 October 1995, and featured the largest voter turnout in Quebec'due south history (93.52%). The "No" selection carried by 54,288 votes (50.58%).^[1] Parizeau, who appear his awaiting resignation equally Quebec premier the following mean solar day, later stated that he would have apace proceeded with a unilateral declaration of independence had the result been affirmative and negotiations failed or been refused,^[2] the latter of which was subsequently revealed every bit the federal position in the outcome of a "Yes" victory.

Controversies over both the provincial vote counting and directly federal financial interest in the final days of the campaign reverberated in Canadian politics for over a decade later the plebiscite took identify. In the backwash of the close result, the federal regime, afterwards unilaterally recognizing Quebec as a singled-out society and amending the federal constitutional veto process, referred the consequence to the Supreme Court of Canada, which stated that the unilateral secession contemplated in the referendum was illegal.

Background [edit]

Quebec, a province in Canada since its foundation in 1867, has e'er been the sole majority French-speaking province. Long ruled by forces (such as the Matrimony Nationale) that focused on affirmation of the province's Francophone and Cosmic identity inside Canada, the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s prompted a surge in civic and economical nationalism, as well as voices calling for the independence of the province and the institution of a nation country. Among these was René Lévesque, who founded the Parti Québécois with agreeing groups seeking independence from Canada. Later winning power in 1976, the PQ government held a referendum in 1980 seeking a mandate to negotiate "sovereignty-clan" with Canada, which was decisively defeated.

In response to the referendum result, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said that he would seek to "patriate" the Canadian Constitution and establish what would eventually become the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. During tense negotiations in Nov 1981, an agreement was reached between Trudeau and ix of the ten provincial premiers by Trudeau, merely not Lévesque. The Constitution Act of 1982 was enacted without the Quebec National Assembly'southward symbolic approval.^[iii]

New Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Quebec Liberal premier Robert Bourassa sought a series of constitutional amendments designed to address Quebec's concerns. In the Meech Lake Accordance, the federal government and all provincial premiers agreed to a series of amendments that decentralized some powers and recognized Quebec as a singled-out society. The Accord, after fierce debate in English language Canada, fell apart in dramatic fashion in the summer of 1990, as 2 provinces failed to ratify it within the iii-year fourth dimension limit required by the constitution. This prompted outrage among Quebec nationalists and a surge in back up for sovereignty. While the Accord was collapsing, Lucien Bouchard, a cabinet government minister in Mulroney's government, led a coalition of six Progressive Bourgeois members of parliament and ane Liberal MP from Quebec to form a new federal party devoted to Quebec sovereignty, the Bloc Québécois.

Following these events, Bourassa said that a plebiscite would be held in 1992, with either sovereignty or a new constitutional agreement as the subject.^[four] This prompted a national plebiscite on the Charlottetown Accord of 1992, a series of amendments that included the proposals of Meech Lake as well every bit concerns of the broader Canadian federation. The Accord failed in Quebec and English Canada.

In the 1993 federal election, equally the Liberals returned to ability with a majority regime under Jean Chrétien, who had been Government minister of Justice during the 1980–81 constitutional discussions, the Bloc Québécois won 54 seats with 49.3% of Quebec's vote. The result made the Bloc the 2nd largest party in the Business firm of Eatables, giving it the role of Official Opposition and assuasive Bouchard to exist able to face up Chrétien in Question Period on a daily basis.

In Quebec, the 1994 provincial election brought the Parti Québécois back to power, led past Jacques Parizeau. The party's platform promised to hold a referendum on sovereignty during his term in part as premier.^[5] The PQ won a majority authorities with 44.75% of the popular vote.

Prelude [edit]

Jacques Parizeau, Premier of Quebec and Leader of the "Yes" Committee

In preparation for the referendum, every household in Quebec was sent a draft of the Deed Respecting the Future of Quebec (besides referred to every bit the Sovereignty Beak), with the announcement of the National Committee on the Future of Quebec to commence in February 1995. The commission was boycotted past the Liberal Party of Quebec, the Liberal Political party of Canada, and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada.^[vi]

The primary result of debate inside the sovereignty motion became on what terms sovereignty would be put earlier the electorate. Parizeau, long identified with the independantiste wing of the party, was opposed to the PQ's general historical preference for an economical relationship with the balance of Canada to be offered aslope sovereignty, every bit he thought this would encourage the Federal government to simply reject to negotiate and cast the project every bit doomed, as had happened in 1980. As a practical matter, Parizeau believed that given the emotional circumstances of separation a special partnership was unlikely, and that given free trade agreements and other multilateral institutions it was unnecessary.

Parizeau's opinion created opposition in the sovereignty movement, which coalesced around Bloc Québécois leader Lucien Bouchard. A popular and charismatic figure, Bouchard had come close to death from necrotizing fasciitis and lost his left leg. His recovery, and subsequent public appearances on crutches, provided a rallying bespeak for sovereigntists and the public at big.^{[7] [eight]} Bouchard thought a proposal lacking a partnership would doom the project among soft nationalists (such as himself) who worried nearly the economic consequences of separation.

As polls showed Parizeau's approach as highly unlikely to even exceed 40% support in a plebiscite^{[ citation needed ]}, leaders of the movement engaged in a heated public debate. Afterward Parizeau moved the planned referendum date to the autumn, Deputy Premier Bernard Landry aroused ire by stating he would not want to be involved in a "charge of the low-cal brigade." During the Bloc's April conference, after a oral communication demanding a change in direction, Bouchard expressed ambiguity to a radio show virtually participating if a partnership proposal was not included. ^[nine] Mario Dumont, leader of the new Action démocratique du Québec, also stated that he would just consider participation in the referendum if a partnership was made part of the question.^[x]

The final findings of the National Commission, issued April 19, included a argument that the public generally desired an economical partnership with Canada.^[11] Fearing Bouchard and Dumont would farther dilute their position as the referendum wore on,^[ten] Parizeau agreed to negotiate a broader approach, and would agree to a statement that included partnership with Dumont and Bouchard on June 12, 1995.^[12] The Agreement contained details of the partnership negotiation process, and a general plan of seeking "sovereignty" while requiring an economic and social partnership offering be negotiated and presented to the balance of Canada. Most importantly for Parizeau, the understanding as well allowed the regime to declare immediate independence if negotiations were not successful or heard after a successful referendum. ^[13]

Bertrand v. Quebec [edit]

The looming referendum prompted a number of actions in the Quebec Superior Courtroom, which were consolidated nether the awarding of prominent lawyer Guy Bertrand. Bertrand asked for acting and permanent injunctions against the holding of the referendum.^[14] The Federal Attorney General declined to arbitrate,^[14] and after failing in a movement to strike the application, the Quebec Chaser Full general unilaterally withdrew from the hearing.^{[15] [16]} The Quebec government moved the September sitting of the National Associates ii days forward to be sure that parliamentary immunity would prevent MNAs from existence summoned to prove.^[16]

Justice Lesage of the Court found that secession could simply legally be performed by constitutional subpoena pursuant to Section 5 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that a unilateral declaration of independence would be "manifestly illegal."^[14] Lesage refused to event an injunction to end the referendum, as he believed that to practice so could paralyze the workings of authorities and cause more disorder than the referendum being held.^[17] The Court opted for declaratory relief, declaring that the Sovereignty Bill and the referendum constituted a serious threat to Bertrand's Charter rights ^{[xiv] [note i]}

Parizeau denounced the decision equally undemocratic,^[18] stated that the Constitution Deed, 1982 did non apply to Quebec,^[nineteen] and refused to motility the referendum timetable.^[18] Quebec Attorney General Paul Bégin stated that he believed an actress-ramble referendum was legal pursuant to international law.^[sixteen] Daniel Johnson announced the following 24-hour interval that the ruling would not change the strategy of the "No" entrada.^[16] Some Federal officials questioned if their level of government could be involved after the declaration,^[16] but ultimately the Federal government decided to participate.

Referendum question [edit]

In a dramatic reading at the Chiliad Théâtre de Québec on September 6, the terminal version of the Sovereignty Neb was unveiled.^[20] The beak would exist tabled in the National Associates awaiting the result of the referendum.

The question in the 1980 plebiscite, in an endeavour to build a broad coalition, had sought only the authority to negotiate sovereignty with the Canadian government, and promised a second referendum to ratify the results of any negotiation. Parizeau believed a second referendum was unnecessary and would only encourage the remainder of Canada to utilize delaying tactics. The draft initial Act featured a question simply request for the authority to declare Quebec sovereign.^{[note 2]}

Pursuant to the partnership agreement with Bouchard and Dumont, the referendum question was inverse to incorporate the partnership understanding. It was presented on September seven, 1995 to be voted on October thirty, 1995. In English language, the question on the ballot asked:

Do you agree that Quebec should get sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the scope of the beak respecting the futurity of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?^{[21] [note 3]}

The question came under immediate fire from federalists, who had no input in the drafting. Quebec Liberal leader Daniel Johnson stated information technology was disruptive and at the very least should accept contained the word "country."^[22] Prominent federalists argued that the referendum question should not take mentioned "partnership" proposals, because no Canadian political leaders outside Quebec had shown any interest in negotiating a possible partnership agreement with an independent Quebec, and arguably no entity capable of undertaking such negotiations actually existed.^[23]

Other federalists argued that the question erroneously unsaid an agreement had been reached betwixt Canada and Quebec regarding a partnership on June 12, 1995. Parizeau would afterward express regret that the understanding had to be cited in the question, but noted that the June 12, 1995 agreement had been sent to every registered voter in the province. ^[24]

Campaign [edit]

Participants [edit]

Daniel Johnson, Jr., leader of the "No" Committee

Pursuant to Quebec's Referendum Deed (enacted by the National Associates prior to the referendum of 1980), the campaign would be conducted as a provincially governed election campaign, and all campaign spending had to be authorized and accounted for nether "Yes" (Le Comité national du OUI) or "No" (Comité des Québécoises et des Québécois pour le Non) umbrella committees. Each committee had an authorized budget of $5 one thousand thousand. Campaign spending by any person or group other than the official committees would be illegal afterwards the official showtime of the referendum campaign.

After the understanding of June 12, the "Yes" campaign would be headed by Jacques Parizeau. The official "No" campaign would be chaired by Liberal leader Daniel Johnson Jr.

Making matters more complex, especially for the "No" camp, was the federal nature of Canada. The governing Liberal Party of Canada and its leader, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien were not strongly represented in the province exterior of Montreal. Chrétien's involvement in the 1982 negotiations and his stance against the Meech Lake Accordance fabricated him unpopular with moderate francophone federalists and sovereignists, who would be the swing voters in the referendum.^[25] Lucienne Robillard, a nationalist quondam Bourassa-era cabinet government minister, would serve as the federal Liberal representative on the "No" committee.^[26] Jean Charest, leader of the Federal Progressive Conservative Party, would be prominently featured, as he and the PCs had closely and productively cooperated with the Quebec Liberals in the Meech Lake negotiations.^[27]

Fearing missteps past politicians not used to Quebec that had occurred during the Meech Lake and Charlottetown debates, Johnson and the entrada heavily controlled appearances by Federal politicians, including Chrétien.^[28] Johnson bluntly banned any appearance past the Reform Party or its leader, Preston Manning.^[29] This would become unchallenged by Ottawa for the majority of the entrada,^[thirty] but created much frustration within the governing Liberals in Ottawa.^[31] Prominent Chrétien adviser Eddie Goldenberg believed that the "No" campaign at some points was more focused on the future ballot position of the Quebec Liberals rather than the referendum itself. ^[32]

Early days [edit]

The campaign officially began on Oct 2, 1995, with a televised accost by both leaders. Parizeau emphasized that he believed this might be the last opportunity for sovereignty for the foreseeable hereafter, while Johnson chose to forecast the uncertainty that a "Yeah" vote could provoke.^[33]

Johnson'southward campaign focused on the applied problems created by the sovereignty procedure, emphasizing that an independent Quebec would be in an uncertain position regarding the North American Gratis Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and not be able to control the Canadian dollar.^[34] Prominent business figures such every bit Power Corporation president Paul Desmarais and Bombardier Inc. head Laurent Beaudoin spoke that they believed a "Yes" victory could spell doom for their Quebec business organization interests.^[35]

The initial campaign for the "Yes" was led by Parizeau, with Dumont candidature separately in rural areas. In add-on to the traditional themes of the move's entreatment to Quebec nationalism, the "Yes" campaign attempted to highlight the slim possibility of any future reform to Canada's federal organization.^[36] Parizeau bitterly attacked business concern leaders for intervening in the referendum, calling it a betrayal of their Quebec customers and workers.^[37] While Parizeau's responses were highly popular with "Yes" stalwarts, information technology was generally seen that speeches confronting business leaders were only highlighting the economic uncertainty that worried swing voters.^[38]

Polls in the first calendar week were highly disappointing for the "Yes" camp, as they showed them backside by 5–7 percentage points among decided voters, with an fifty-fifty larger gap if "undecided" voters were weighed toward the "No" side as would by and large exist expected.^[39] Parizeau, a general fixture in Quebec politics for decades whose strong views of sovereignty were well known among the populace, was under pressure level to create a spark.^[39]

Appointment of Bouchard [edit]

In an unannounced ceremony on October 7 at the Université de Montréal, Parizeau made a surprise annunciation: He appointed Bouchard as "chief negotiator" for the partnership talks post-obit a "Yes" vote.^[40] The move came every bit a dramatic surprise to the campaign, promoting the popular Bouchard to the fore and simultaneously emphasizing the "partnership" attribute of the question. ^[41]

Bouchard, already popular, became a sensation: in addition to his medical struggles and charisma, his more than moderate approach and prominent interest in the Meech Lake Accord while in Ottawa reminded undecided nationalist voters of federal missteps from years by. ^[42] Politicians on both sides described his appeal as messianic and nigh impossible to personally attack, in contrast to the well-worn figures on both sides of the plebiscite.^[43] "No" advisor John Parisella noted that at focus groups, when presented with statements Bouchard had made that they did not similar, participants would refuse to believe he meant them.^[42] New polls eventually showed a majority of Quebecers intending to vote "Yes".^[44]

"No" forces, including Johnson, were shocked by the evolution, which required wholesale changes in strategy iii weeks before the vote. ^[45] Unwilling to believe Parizeau had given up his leadership part voluntarily, well-nigh in the "No" camp and Ottawa had assumed a insurrection had taken place, though the manoeuvre had been planned and voluntary.^[46] The dramatic events prompted many federal politicians to lobby for similarly dramatic intervention from Ottawa and the federal authorities, which were refused by the "No" committee, who believed that with Bouchard'due south introduction the margin for error was dramatically reduced. ^[47] The "No" campaign connected to focus on the economic benefits of federation. ^[48]

Bouchard's speeches asked Quebecers to vote "Yes" to requite a clear mandate for alter, and that but the clarity of a "Yes" vote would provide a final solution to Canada'due south long-continuing ramble issues and a new partnership with English Canada for the edification of both.^[49] Bouchard'south popularity was such that his remarks that the Québécois were the "white race" with the lowest rate of reproduction, which threatened to cast the project as focused on ethnic nationalism, were traversed with ease.^[50] Bloc Québécois MP Suzanne Tremblay was less successful in this regard, and apologized after answering announcer Joyce Napier'due south question of how minority francophones outside of Quebec would exist helped by independence by stating that Napier'southward last name and lack of a Québécois accent made her ignorant of the subject field.^{[51] [52]}

Midcampaign [edit]

Election sign for the "Yep" side. Others versions featured a loonie money, a globe, a flower, ♀, and a "men working" traffic sign in place of the "O."

Pursuant to the Referendum Deed, both committees were required to contribute to a brochure sent to every voter describing their positions.^[53] The official "No" brochure, written by the Quebec Liberals, stated that Quebec was a singled-out society, and that Quebec should enjoy full autonomy in areas of provincial jurisdiction.^[53] Parizeau, while speaking in Hull, challenged Chrétien to tell voters that, if "No" won, Ottawa would withdraw from all provincial jurisdictions, prompting a vague response from the "No" campaign.^[54]

On October 21 in Longueuil, Johnson, hoping to defuse the outcome, ad libbed a challenge to Chrétien to declare his position on singled-out society recognition.^[55] When presented with the request Chrétien, in New York for a United nations meeting, responded, "No. We're not talking about the Constitution, we're talking well-nigh the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada."^[56] The remarks in direct contradiction to Johnson were portrayed in the printing equally a blunt refusal.^[57]

Chrétien's position was far more difficult than Johnson's: function of the 1993 Liberal election platform had been moving the country away from large scale constitutional debates. Provincial governments were also far more hostile to the constitutional process than they had been in the decade prior, with even the federal government'southward typical marry, Ontario, being firmly against any pursuit of constitutional accommodation.^[58]

French President Jacques Chirac, while answering a phone call from a viewer in Montreal on CNN's Larry King Live, declared that, if the "Yes" side were successful, the fact that the referendum had succeeded would be recognized by France.^[59]

At a federalist rally of near 12,500 people which was held at the Verdun Auditorium on October 24, Chrétien introduced a focus on Quebec's emotional attachment to Canada, promised reforms to give Quebec more power, and in a more than startling declaration, alleged that he would back up enshrinement of Quebec as a distinct society and that he would back up reforms to the Canadian constitution.^[60] The sudden reversal of Chrétien'due south long-standing position on the issue, along with Chrétien's wan complexion and atypically nervous appearance, sparked considerable comment.^[61] Charest farther emphasized his commitment to constitutional reform if a "No" victory was achieved.^[60]

Ancient activism [edit]

In response to the referendum, aboriginal peoples in Quebec strongly affirmed their own correct to self-determination. First Nations chiefs said that forcing their peoples to join an independent Quebec without their consent would violate international police force, violating their rights to self-decision. Aboriginal groups also demanded to be full participants in whatsoever new ramble negotiations resulting from the plebiscite.^[62]

The Grand Quango of the Crees in Northern Quebec was especially vocal and prominent in its resistance to the thought of being included in an independent Quebec. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come up issued a legal newspaper, titled Sovereign Injustice,^[63] which sought to affirm the Cree right to self-determination in keeping their territories in Canada. On October 24, 1995, the Cree organized their ain referendum, asking the question: "Exercise y'all consent, as a people, that the Government of Quebec separate the James Bay Crees and Cree traditional territory from Canada in the event of a Yes vote in the Quebec plebiscite?" 96.3% of the 77% of Crees who bandage ballots voted to stay in Canada. The Inuit of Nunavik held a similar local vote, request voters "Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign?", with 96% voting No.^[62] Start Nations communities contributed significantly to the tense argue on a hypothetical sectionalization of Quebec.^{[ citation needed ]}

25 October 1995: Three addresses [edit]

Jean Chrétien, Prime Government minister of Canada

5 days before the vote, United states President Neb Clinton, while recognizing the plebiscite equally an internal issue of Canada, gave a infinitesimal-long statement extolling the virtues of a united Canada, catastrophe with "Canada has been a groovy model for the rest of the world, and has been a great partner of the Us, and I hope that can continue."^[64] While the statement provided relief in sovereignist circles for non being a stronger endorsement of the "No" position,^[65] the implication of Clinton, who was pop in Quebec and the leader of the province's almost important trading partner, endorsing Canadian unity had strong reverberations in the electorate.^[64]

The same night, Prime number Government minister Jean Chrétien gave a televised address to the nation in English and French. Broadly similar in both languages, Chrétien promoted the virtues of Canadian federalism to Quebec, touched on the shared values of the country, warned that Parizeau would use the referendum result equally a mandate to declare independence from Canada (while explicitly non stating the result would exist accepted), and announced that Quebec would be recognized as a distinct society and that whatsoever future constitutional reform that impacted Quebec would be made with the province's consent.^[66]

The "Yes" side was provided airtime for a rebuttal in English and French. Lucien Bouchard was given the task in both languages, with the "Yes" campaign stating that a federal politico should give the response.^[67] Bouchard'south French address recounted the previous animosities of the constitutional fence, specifically targeting Chrétien's career and actions, including showing a newspaper headline from the aftermath of the 1982 Constitution that featured Trudeau and Chrétien laughing.^[68] Bouchard so focused on the details of the partnership aspect of the proposal.^[67] He used his English address to inquire Canadians to sympathize the "Yes" side and to announce an intention to negotiate in good faith.^[67]

Unity Rally [edit]

The "No" side's election sign.

Fisheries Government minister Brian Tobin, expressing anxiety to his staff near the referendum the calendar week before, was told most a small rally planned in Identify du Canada in Montreal for businesspersons on October 27.^[69] Asked past Federal advisor John Rae, Pierre Claude Nolin agreed to allow Tobin to invite Canadians outside Quebec to the rally, provided Quebec's plebiscite laws were adhered to.^[70] Tobin then encouraged beau caucus members to ship as many people as possible.^[71]

After gaining permission from the Prime Minister (over the objections of Quebec members of Cabinet^[72]), Tobin then appeared on the national English-linguistic communication Canada AM, and while disavowing any connection with the "No" arrangement, announced that the "No" side would be holding a rally in Montreal on October 27, and implored Canadians from effectually the country to attend the rally to support the "crusade for Canada." ^[73] Tobin noted that committees were being formed in Ottawa and Toronto, charter aircraft were beingness ordered, and that Canadian Airlines had a 90% off "unity" sale.^[74] Tobin proceeded to call the chairman of Air Canada in his chapters equally a private citizen and propose planes be made available at the same rate, a request that was granted.^[74]

Tobin'due south Canada AM appearance resulted in calls flooding MP's offices in English Canada, and bus companies volunteered hundreds of vehicles to accept Canadians from exterior of Quebec to Montreal. ^[75] The rally at Place du Canada was estimated to have between 50,000 and 125,000 attendees, with estimates varying wildly as the crowd grew and shrank throughout the day. ^[76] Jean Chrétien, Jean Charest and Daniel Johnson spoke to the crowd for the occasion, which would become known as the "Unity Rally".^[75] Images of the large oversupply with an oversized Canadian flag became iconic. ^[77] Charest felt the rally helped to proceed momentum for the "No" campaign moving.^[78]

The federal regime's intervention in the rally attracted strident protests from the "Yes" side, who felt the discounts and coordination were an illegal intervention in the referendum.^[79] Bouchard publicly contrasted the rally with what he believed was the inattention of English language Canada to the plummet of the Meech Lake Accord.^[80] Nolin regretted granting permission for the "No" commission once the scale became known,^[81] and Johnson felt the rally only exacerbated tensions with regard to English language Canada. Opinions on whether the rally had an impact were divided and unable to be gauged, as the rally happened while the final polls for the Monday referendum were being produced. ^[82]

Stance polling [edit]

During the entrada, polls were reported past all pollsters and press outlets with a general guideline of having undecided voters split unevenly in favour of the "No" side: This ranged from two/3 to three/four of the undecided vote.

Completion Date	Polling organisation/client	Sample size	Yes	No	Undecided	Lead
xxx Oct 1995	Official results	4,757,509	49.42%	50.58%		1.16%
October 27	Léger & Léger	1,003	47%	41%	12%	6%
Oct 27	Unity Rally held
October 25	SOM	ane,115	46%	twoscore%	14%	6%
Oct 25	Angus Reid	ane,029	48%	44%	eight%	4%
Oct 25	Bouchard and Chrétien Television Addresses, Clinton Remarks
Oct 23	Ingather	1,072	44%	43%	13%	2%
October 20	Léger & Léger	1,005	46%	42%	12%	4%
October 18	Angus Reid	1,012	45%	44%	xi%	1%
Oct xvi	CROP	1,151	42%	44%	14%	two%
Oct 16	SOM	981	43%	43%	xiv%	0%
Oct 12	Léger & Léger	ane,002	45%	42%	xiii%	3%
October 12	Gallup	1,013	39%	43%	18%	4%
Oct 11	Créatec	470	43%	49%	8%	six%
October nine	Lepage	ane,285	45%	42%	13%	3%
Oct vii	Lucien Bouchard announced equally Primary Negotiator for the Yes side
Oct 4	Léger & Léger	1,015	43%	44%	13%	1%
Sep 29	Lepage	ane,369	44%	46%	x%	2%
Sep 28	Léger & Léger	one,006	44%	45%	11%	1%
Sep 27	Angus Reid	i,000	41%	45%	14%	iv%
Sep 25	SOM/Environics	1,820	39%	48%	13%	nine%
Sep 25	CROP	two,020	39%	47%	fourteen%	viii%
Sep 25	Decima	750	forty%	42%	18%	2%
Sep xix	Créatec	one,004	39%	46%	15%	7%
Sep xiv	COMPAS	500	36%	40%	24%	4%
Sep 12	SOM	ane,003	37%	45%	xviii%	8%
Sep 9	Léger & Léger	959	44%	43%	13%	one%
Sources: Polls & the 1995 Quebec Referendum, p.15

Effect [edit]

Map of the 1995 referendum by provincial riding. Ridings in Scarlet voted "No", while ridings in bluish voted "Yes". Despite having a lower vote total, many ridings were won by a plurality of Yes votes due to the geographic spread of voters. Many No votes were heavily full-bodied in a few ridings, typically in urban regions.

93.52% of the five,087,009 registered Quebecers voted in the referendum, a college turnout than any provincial or federal ballot in Canada'southward history. The proposal of June 12, 1995 was rejected by voters, with 50.58% voting "No" and 49.42% voting "Aye". The margin was significantly smaller than the 1980 referendum. The "Yes" side was the pick of French speakers by an estimated majority of nearly 60%.^[83] Anglophones and allophones (those who exercise non accept English or French equally a kickoff language) voted "No" by a margin of 95%.^[83]

There was a majority "Yes" vote in fourscore out of 125 National Assembly ridings.^[83] The "Yes" side was strongest in Saguenay–Lac-Saint-Jean, the Gaspé, the Middle-du-Québec, and generally the suburbs of Quebec City and Montreal. While there was disappointment in the results of Montreal and the Beauce, Quebec City's soft support for "Yeah" was the greatest surprise for the "Yes" side.^[83] This prompted speculation that provincial civil servants did not want the uncertainty a "Yes" would bring, especially after Parizeau had promised to integrate displaced Federal civil servants in a sovereign Quebec.^[83]

The heavily populated West Isle ridings of Montreal, dwelling to a large anglophone population, voted "No" by margins eclipsing lxxx%; some polling stations recorded no "Yes" votes at all.^[84] The far North, the Outaouais, the Beauce, and the Eastern Townships also generally voted "No".

The riding with the highest "Yes" consequence was Saguenay along the northern shore with 73.3% voting aye; The riding with the highest "No" consequence was D'Arcy-McGee in the West Island with 96.38% voting "No"; The riding with the closest result was Vimont in Laval, which the "Yes" won by 6 votes and the highest turnout was in Marguerite-D'Youville (96.52%).^[85]

Quebec referendum, 1995

Choice	Votes	%
No	ii,362,648	l.58
Aye	2,308,360	49.42
Valid votes	4,671,008	98.18
Invalid or blank votes	86,501	1.82
Total votes	4,757,509	100.00
Registered voters and turnout	5,087,009	93.52

National referendum results (without spoiled ballots)

Aye: 2,308,360 (49.4%)	No: 2,362,648 (50.6%)
▲

Immediate responses [edit]

"No" supporters gathered at Métropolis in Montreal, where Johnson expressed promise for reconciliation in Quebec and stated he expected the federal government to pursue constitutional changes.^[84] Prime number Minister Chrétien echoed similar sentiments to Johnson, and stated that he "extended his manus" to Quebec's premier and government.^[86]

"Yes" supporters met at the Palais des congrès de Montréal on referendum night. After the result became known, Dumont and Bouchard fabricated speeches accepting the result as part of the motility's democratic convictions and expressing hope that a subsequent referendum would bring a "Aye" victory.^[87]

Jacques Parizeau, who had not prepared a concession speech, rejected i prepared by Jean-François Lisée and spoke without notes. Noting that 60% of French-speakers had voted yep, he stated that he would address French-speaking Québécois as nous ("we"), and that they had spoken clearly in favour of the "Yeah."^[88] He then stated that the only matter that had stopped the "Yes" side was "money and the ethnic vote" and that the side by side referendum would be successful with merely a few percentage more of French speakers onside.^[88] The remarks, widely lambasted in the Canadian and international press as ethnocentric, sparked surprise and acrimony in the "Yes" camp, equally the move had gone to great lengths to disown ethnic nationalism.^[89]

Bernard Landry confronted Parizeau at a Cabinet meeting the next morning time about the remarks, stating that the movement "had to hibernate its head in shame."^[90] Parizeau, after canvassing opinions, then told his Cabinet that he would resign every bit premier and leader of the Parti Québécois. It was later revealed that he had alleged he would retire anyway if the "Yeah" side lost, in an embargoed interview with TVA taped days before the referendum.

Six days after the referendum, André Dallaire, a schizophrenic "Yes" supporter upset at the effect, broke into Chrétien'south Ottawa residence armed with a pocketknife.^[91] Dallaire attempted to find Chrétien and kill the prime number minister in his bed before being discovered by Aline Chrétien, who barricaded the bedroom door.^[92] Chrétien was unharmed, and Dallaire would eventually be found not criminally responsible by reason of mental defect.^[93]

Contingency training for a "Yes" victory [edit]

Mario Dumont, leader of the ADQ and member of the "Yes" side.

Sovereignists [edit]

Sovereignists believed that a "Yes" vote of fifty% plus i vote was a binding result pursuant to the Referendum Act and the Sovereignty Bill, ^[94] too as the general international police principle of cocky-determination. In the issue of a "Yes" victory, Parizeau had said he intended to return to the National Assembly of Quebec within two days of the result and seek support for a motion recognizing the result of the referendum.^[95] In a speech he had prepared in the event of a "Yes" victory, he said a sovereign Quebec'due south first motility would be to "extend a paw to its Canadian neighbour" in partnership pursuant to the wording of the referendum.^[96]

Parizeau'due south immediate plans afterward the referendum relied upon what he felt would be general force per unit area from economic markets and the business customs in English Canada to stabilize the state of affairs as quickly every bit possible, which he believed would mitigate any catastrophic initial events (such as blockades) and prepare for negotiations.^[97]

Despite the prominent placement of Bouchard in the referendum campaign, Parizeau planned to retain all authority with regard to negotiations, and to engage most members of the negotiation team if they were to occur.^[98] Parizeau also believed federalist Quebecers such equally Chrétien and Charest would be quickly disregarded and replaced at negotiations by representatives from the other ix provinces. ^[99] If the Federal authorities refused to negotiate, or if negotiations were to exceed Oct 30, 1996, Parizeau stated that he would proceed with a unilateral proclamation of independence (UDI) for an contained Quebec pursuant to Section 26 of the Sovereignty Bill.^[two]

Parizeau's hopes for international recognition, a practical requirement of statehood, rested with France and the Francophonie. He believed that if Quebec declared independence in these circumstances, President of the French National Assembly Philippe Séguin, a powerful Gaullist power broker who was sympathetic to the sovereignty movement,^[100] would pressure President Chirac to recognize the announcement.^[101] He counted on a French recognition to spread quickly to the Francophonie and bring the upshot to a caput.^[102] Benoit Bouchard, Canada'southward ambassador at the fourth dimension, believed that the program was irrational equally he doubted Séguin, who was supposed to exist a neutral figure in his role, could bring sufficient pressure in the country'southward semi-presidential organization.^[103]

In interviews conducted in 2014, Bouchard^[104] and Dumont^[105] both believed that negotiations would have resulted had the "Yes" side won and that Quebec would take remained in Canada with a more autonomous status. Bouchard, while approving of Parizeau's intention to unilaterally declare independence should negotiations be refused,^[106] implied that he and Dumont would accept been able to control negotiations and offer a subsequent referendum on a new agreement.^[107] Dumont noted that international recognition would take been difficult had two of the iii leaders of the "Yep" entrada been against a UDI, and that he and Bouchard were willing to slow the process downward if necessary. ^[108] For his role, Bernard Landry believed that nothing short of a seat at the United Nations would have been accomplished had the "Yes" won.^[109]

Federalists [edit]

Recognition [edit]

Every bit the referendum was just of force and effect pursuant to a provincial constabulary, neither the provincially sanctioned "No" committee nor the Federal government had any input on the question of the plebiscite. Federalists strongly differed on how or if a "Yes" referendum result would be recognized. "No" campaign head Daniel Johnson disputed the "Yeah" side'southward position that a simple majority was sufficient to declare independence, as he believed the question was besides vague and gave negotiators too broad a mandate given the enormity of the issue and the doubt of negotiations.^{[110] [111]}

Jean Chrétien refused to publicly comment or consider contingencies regarding a possible "Yeah" victory, and at no point stated the referendum bound the Federal regime to negotiations or permitted a unilateral annunciation of independence.^[112] His wording of speeches during the referendum noted that Parizeau would interpret a "Yeah" vote as a mandate to dissever Quebec from Canada, only never offered recognition that this was legal or recognizable. A speech drafted for Chrétien in the event of a "Yep" vote stated that the question was too ambiguous to be bounden and that only dissatisfaction with the status quo had been stated.^[112]

Reform party leader Preston Manning, a prominent proponent of direct democracy, would have recognized any result, with critics suspecting he preferred a "Yes" vote for balloter gain.^[113] Jean Charest recognized the plebiscite's legitimacy, although a typhoon post-referendum speech had him interpreting a "Yeah" vote every bit a call for drastic reform of Canadian federation instead of separation.^[114] The New Democratic Political party's official position was that the outcome had to exist recognized.^[113]

Negotiations [edit]

Little planning was made for the possibility of a "Yep" vote by the Canadian federal government, with the general consensus being that the referendum would exist hands won and that planning would spark panic or requite the referendum undeserved legitimacy. Some members of the federal cabinet met to discuss several possible scenarios, including referring the issue of Quebec's independence to the Supreme Courtroom. Senior ceremonious servants met to consider the impact of a vote for secession on issues such as territorial boundaries and the federal debt. A dispute arose as to whether Jean Chrétien and many prominent members of Cabinet who had been elected in Quebec ridings could represent Canada at a hypothetical partnership negotiation.^[115]

Manning intended to immediately telephone call for Chrétien'due south resignation and for a general election if the referendum were successful,^[116] even though the Liberals, independently of their Quebec seats, had a sizable majority in the House of Commons.^[115] There was also some doubt that Chrétien would be able to clinch the Governor General that he retained enough support inside his political party to remain the Prime number Minister of Canada.^{[115] [117]} Chrétien'southward intention was, any the result, to stay in office.^[118] New Brunswick Premier Frank McKenna later confirmed that he had been invited into a hypothetical "National Unity" cabinet if the "Yes" side was victorious,^[119] with a general understanding that onetime Ontario Premier Bob Rae was to be included as well.^[120]

Premier of Saskatchewan Roy Romanow secretly formed a commission to study consequences if Quebec successfully seceded, including strengthening Saskatchewan's relationships with other western provinces, as well seceding from Canada, or joining the United States.^[121]

Controversies post-referendum [edit]

Rejected ballots [edit]

When the counting was completed, approximately 86,000 ballots were rejected past Deputy Returning Officers, alleging that they had non been marked properly by the voter. Each polling station featured a Deputy Returning Officer (appointed by the "Yes") who counted the ballots while a Poll Clerk (appointed by the "No") recorded the result of the count.^[122]

Controversy arose over whether the Deputy Returning Officers of the Chomedey, Marguerite-Bourgeois and Laurier-Dorion ridings had improperly rejected ballots. In these ridings the "No" vote was dominant, and the proportion of rejected ballots was 12%,^[123] 5.5% and three.6%.^{[124] [125]} Thomas Mulcair, member of the Quebec National Assembly for Chomedey, told reporters that in that location was "an orchestrated attempt to steal the vote" in his riding.^[123] A study released months after the plebiscite past McGill University ended that ridings with a greater number of "No" votes had a higher percentage of rejected ballots.^[126] Directeur général des élections du Québec (DGEQ), Pierre F. Cote, launched an inquiry into the declared irregularities, supervised by the Principal Justice of the Quebec Superior Courtroom, Alan B. Gold. All ballots of the three ridings plus a sample of ballots from other ridings were examined. The inquiry concluded that some ballots had been rejected without valid reasons, but the incidents were isolated. The bulk of the rejected ballots were "No" votes, in proportion to the bulk of the valid votes in those districts.

Two Deputy Returning Officers were charged by the DGEQ with violating elections laws, but in 1996 were establish non guilty (a decision upheld by the Quebec Court of Appeal), afterwards it was found that the ballots were not rejected in a fraudulent or irregular fashion, and that there was no proof of conspiracy.^[127] A Quebec Court judge acquitted a Deputy Returning Officeholder charged with illegally rejecting 53% of the ballots cast at his Chomedey polling commune.

In 2000, the Quebec Superior Court denied an application past Alliance Quebec that attempted to force the DGEQ to requite access to all 5 million ballots, ruling that the only authority that could exercise then expired in 1996.^{[128] [129]} The plebiscite ballots were shredded and recycled in 2008 afterwards appeals were wearied.^[130] In May 2005, old PQ Chiffonier minister Richard Le Hir said that the PQ coordinated the election rejections, which PQ officials denied.^{[131] [132]}

Citizenship and Immigration Canada [edit]

Citizenship Court judges from beyond Canada were sent into the province to ensure as many qualified immigrants living in Quebec as possible had Canadian citizenship before the plebiscite, and thus were able to vote. The goal was to take 10,000 to 20,000 outstanding citizenship applications candy for residents of Quebec by mid-October.^[133] 43,855 new Quebecers obtained their Canadian citizenship during 1995, with about 1 quarter of these (11,429) beingness granted during the calendar month of Oct.^[134] When confronted almost the issue past a Bloc Québécois MP who suggested shortcuts were being taken to hurry citizenship applications for immigrants who would most likely vote "No", Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Sergio Marchi responded that this was common before provincial election campaigns in other provinces.^[135]

Spending limits and Option Canada [edit]

The Canadian Unity Council incorporated a Montreal-based lobbying group called Option Canada with the mandate to promote federalism in Quebec.^{[136] [137]} Selection Canada received $i.6 1000000 in funding from the Canadian Heritage Department in 1994, $three.35 1000000 in 1995 and $one.1 million in 1996.^[138] The Montreal Gazette reported in March 1997 that the group also had other funds from undeclared sources.^[137] A Commission to Register Voters Outside Quebec was created to aid citizens who had left Quebec earlier the 1995 vote register on the electoral listing. The Commission handed out pamphlets during the referendum, including a form to be added to the list of voters. The pamphlet gave out a price-complimentary number as contact information, which was the same number as the one used by the Canadian Unity Council.^[139]

Subsequently the referendum, the DSEQ filed 20 criminal charges of illegal expenditures by Option Canada and others on behalf of the "No" side, which were dropped subsequently the Supreme Court of Canada in Libman vs. Quebec-Attorney Full general ruled sections of the Referendum Act restricting 3rd-party expenditures were unconstitutionally restrictive under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Aurèle Gervais, communications manager for the Liberal Party of Canada, also as the students' association at Ottawa'south Algonquin College, were charged with infractions of Quebec'south Election Human activity after the plebiscite for illegally hiring buses to bring supporters to Montreal for the rally.^[140] Environment Government minister Sergio Marchi told reporters that Gervais should habiliment [the charges against him] like a bluecoat of honour."^[141] Two years afterwards, the Quebec Superior Courtroom dismissed the charges, stating that the actions took place outside of Quebec and so the Quebec Election Act did not apply.^[142]

The DSEQ asked retired Quebec court judge Bernard Grenier in 2006 to investigate Choice Canada after the publication of Normand Lester and Robin Philpot'southward "The Secrets of Pick Canada", which alleged over $v,000,000 had been spent helping the "No" campaign.^[143] Grenier determined that CA$539,000 was illegally spent past the "No" side during the referendum, although he drew no conclusions over the "Unity Rally." Grenier said there was no evidence of wrongdoing by Jean Charest or that the rally was part of a plan to sabotage the sovereigntist motility.^[144] Grenier urged Quebecers in his study to move on.^[144] The Bloc Québécois called for a federal inquiry, which did non occur.

Responses [edit]

After the referendum, the ballot for Quebec elections was redesigned to reduce the size of the infinite where voters could indicate their option^[146] and the rules on allowable markings were relaxed, so that Deputy Returning Officers would have fewer grounds for rejecting ballots. The Quebec government also changed the Electoral Human activity so that voters would need to show a Canadian passport, Quebec drivers' licence or Quebec provincial health care card at the polling station for identification purposes in future elections.

Aftermath [edit]

Quebec [edit]

Parizeau's resignation led to Bouchard becoming the leader of the PQ and premier unopposed. While Bouchard maintained a tertiary referendum was forthcoming provided "winning conditions" occurred, his regime's chief priority became reform of the Quebec economy. Daniel Johnson would resign every bit leader of the Liberal Political party of Quebec, and later on pregnant pressure in English language Canada, Charest resigned equally national PC leader and was acclaimed as leader of the Quebec Liberals.

Observers expected Bouchard to denote some other sovereignty referendum if his party won the 1998 Quebec general election.^[147] While he defeated Charest, Bouchard continued his government'southward focus on austerity. Bouchard retired in 2001 and was replaced past Bernard Landry who, despite promising a more robust stance on the sovereignty issue, was ousted in the 2003 Quebec full general election by Charest, who would become premier.

Distinct society and veto [edit]

After the referendum, Chrétien attempted to pursue constitutional recognition of distinct society, just was stopped by the blunt refusal of Ontario Premier Mike Harris to discuss any ramble matters. Not wanting to engage in the same negotiations with provincial governments that had dominated the Trudeau and Mulroney governments, Chrétien opted to pursue unilateral federal changes to fulfill his government'due south commitments. This included the Act respecting constitutional amendments, which required permission from the provinces of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia for federal approval to be granted to any ramble subpoena, granting Quebec a de facto veto. The Federal parliament too officially recognized Quebec as a distinct society. Both changes, not being constitutional amendments, are theoretically reversible by future parliaments.

"Program B" [edit]

Chrétien too pursued what he called "Plan B" in hopes of disarming Quebec voters that economic and legal obstacles would follow if Quebec were to declare itself sovereign; its public face would become professor Stéphane Dion.^[148] This included a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, which followed Federal intervention post-referendum into the Bertrand case: The 1998 Reference Re Secession of Quebec stated that unilateral secession was illegal, would crave a constitutional amendment, and that only a clear majority on a articulate question could bring about any sort of obligation on the federal and provincial governments to negotiate secession.

After the decision, the Liberal authorities passed the Clarity Act, which stated that whatsoever hereafter referendum would take to be on a "clear question" and that information technology would have to represent a "clear majority" for the federal Parliament to recognize its validity. Section 1(four) of the Deed stated that questions that provided for but a mandate for negotiation or envisioned other partnerships with Canada would be considered unclear, and thus not recognized. The National Assembly of Quebec passed Bill 99, proclaiming the right of self-determination and the correct of the National Assembly to ready plebiscite questions pursuant to the Referendum Deed and to declare the winning majority in a plebiscite as a simple majority of fifty% plus ane vote. Pecker 99'southward constitutionality was litigated for 25 years,^[149] until the Quebec Courtroom of Entreatment ruled in 2021 that the police had been carefully worded then as not to violate the constitution.^[150]

Sponsorship scandal [edit]

Post-obit the narrow victory, the Chrétien government established a pro-Canada advertising campaign. The aim was to sponsor hunting, fishing and other recreational events, and in doing so promote Canada within Quebec. While many of the events sponsored were legitimate, a large sum of money was mismanaged. Accountant General Sheila Fraser released a report in November 2003, outlining the problems. This eventually led to the Gomery Commission's investigation of the Sponsorship Scandal. Bloc Québécois leader Gilles Duceppe argued that Canada was trying to "buy" federalism and using it as an excuse to channel dirty money into Liberal-friendly pockets.

Run into also [edit]

• 1980 Quebec referendum
• Quebec sovereignty movement
• Quebec federalist ideology
• Quebec nationalism
• National Question (Quebec)
• Politics of Quebec
• History of Quebec
• 1999 Australian republic referendum
• 2014 Scottish independence referendum
• 2016 United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland Eu membership referendum

Notes [edit]

1. ^ The Court specifically named Sections 2,3,vi,7, 15, and 24(1) of the Lease. (Haljan, 303)
2. ^ Are you in favour of the Act passed by the National Associates declaring the sovereignty of Quebec? (Draft Beak Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec "Typhoon Neb on the Sovereignty of Quebec". Archived from the original on 2010-07-02. Retrieved 2009-07-26 . )
3. ^ In French :"Acceptez-vous que le Québec devienne souverain, après avoir offert formellement au Canada un nouveau partenariat économique et politique, dans le cadre du projet de loi sur l'avenir du Québec et de l'entente signée le 12 juin 1995?"

References [edit]

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149. ^ Wells, Paul (October 18, 2013). "Exclusive: Stephen Harper'southward legal challenge to Quebec secession". Maclean'southward. Ottawa. Retrieved May 10, 2021.
150. ^ Wells, Paul (April x, 2021). "Court rejects Henderson's appeal of Bill 99 ruling, but he cries victory anyway". Montreal Gazette. Montreal. Retrieved Feb 22, 2022.

Consulted works/further reading [edit]

• Argyle, Ray (2004). Turning Points: The Campaigns that Changed Canada 2004 and Before . Toronto: White Knight Publications. ISBN978-0-9734186-6-8.
• Central, Mario (2005). Breaking Betoken: Quebec, Canada, The 1995 Referendum. Montreal: Bayard Canada Books. ISBN2-89579-068-X.
• Chrétien, Jean (2007). My Years every bit Prime Minister . Toronto: Vintage Canada. ISBN978-0-676-97901-5.
• CBC documentary Breaking Point (2005)
• Robin Philpot (2005). Le Référendum volé . Montreal: Les éditions des intouchables. ISBN2-89549-189-five.
• Haljan, David (2014). Constitutionalising Secession. Portland: Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN9781782253303.
• Hébert, Chantal (With Jean Lapierre) (2014). The Morn Later on: The 1995 Referendum and the Day that Almost Was . Toronto: Alfred A Knopf Canada. ISBN978-0-345-80762-5.
• Paul Jay documentary Neverendum Plebiscite
• Fox, John; Andersen, Robert; Dubonnet, Joseph (1999). "The Polls and the 1995 Quebec Referendum". Canadian Journal of Folklore. 24 (3): 411–424. doi:10.2307/3341396. JSTOR 3341396.

External links [edit]

• Le Directeur Général des Élections du Québec
• CBC Digital Athenaeum – Separation Anxiety: The 1995 Quebec Referendum
• CBC Referendum Dark Coverage (from C-Bridge)

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Quebec_referendum

Posted by: desrochersponoulace.blogspot.com

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